Judicial reform in Afghanistan is
Introduction
This article examines the main causes and practices of corruption and clientelism in the Afghan justice sector. It initially defines corruption in basic terms followed by an explanation of legal pluralism adopted in context of merging all facets of the Afghan judicial sector. It employs a political economy approach -that includes Afghan social contract -to assess corruption. The social contract concerns the perceived authority and legitimacy of the state and socially accepted and unaccepted behaviours of adjudicators. This is to analyse the bureaucratic structures and entry-points for corruption and the social norms that commence during transactions between adjudicators and citizens. The analysis reveals that there are many interpenetrating features of the causes and consequences of corruption in the judicial sector that also stretches beyond the formal bureaucratic structures of the state and its formal institutions. This is due to the engrained social processes, fragmented solidarity networks and malleable local power structures -tribal qawm systems -in place. Moreover, non-meritocratic appointments and poorly educated judges and prosecutors within the Afghan justice sector have led to a lowly skilled judiciary that is as 'behaviour that deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains'. The private gains and payoffs are part of social corruption. Clientelism is also linked to nepotism, ethnic and tribal favouritism. Applying a broad notion of corruption may span beyond giftgiving/tipping, minor gratuities and include other actions that are not deemed moral such as 'womanizing' and lying in certain cultures (Pavarala and Malik 2010, 20) . In Afghan culture, the term fasad means something or an action viewed as 'dirty or prostitute' which cannot be supported (De Lauri 2013, 534) . Gupta (1995) reveals that many definitions of corruption are culturally biased and ignore the cultural connotations as to what subjectively qualifies as corruption. Corruption is socially constructed in all societies with some activities blatantly qualifying as corruption but in other societies such action(s) may be an accepted part of preserving social relations.
Analytical Approaches
Now that the narrow and broad definitions of corruption have been addressed, theoretical frameworks to analyse corruption will follow. These theoretical frameworks to assess corruption include legal pluralist, functionalist and political economy approaches. The main body of the paper will examine shortcomings and corruption in the Afghan judicial system which will reflect on the theoretical frameworks. The subsequent section will cover sociological approaches to corruption that also includes an emphasis on morality, ethics and religion.
Legal Pluralism
Legal pluralism concerns multiple legal systems within a society or political unit. Structures of dispute resolution and customary norms and law exist alongside formalized and dominant laws within a constitutional regime either imposed by a former colony or international intervention (Pimentel 2011, 59 ). Usually, these structures cover land, family and marriage issues but other issues such as criminal cases and transactions overlap in informal and formal justice sectors. The mode of legal claim/dispute resolution depends on best interests, advantage and accessibility. Constitution. An attempt has been made to juggle local codes of dispute resolution, codified and uncodified Shari'a law and secular law. Articles 3, 6 and 7 of the 2004 Afghan Constitution state that a sustainable justice system should respect Islamic legal tradition and remain open to interpreting older Islamic jurisprudence in compliance with human rights and public accountability (Tondini 2007, 334) . This coexists and contests local and informal modes of legal practice.
There were numerous projects in Afghanistan that attempted to reconcile state justice exercising the rule of law and fundamental human rights such as the right to a defence lawyer and fair trial with Jirgas 1 . Wimpelmann (2013) cites the Department for International Development (DFID) Justice Adviser: United Kingdom (UK) Aid efforts of building the capacity and competence, including training, of formalized legal rules and the rule of law in southern Afghanistan. The Justice Adviser claimed that DFID was working on enhancing informal means of redress mainly in Helmand. This was 'to build accountability from the bottom-up process within local councils so that there can be accountability at both levels to rebuild faith in the formal legalized rules and standards across Afghanistan'.
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Legal pluralism has thus partly been adopted in Afghanistan to merge several codes of legal and customary practices that adhere with the rule of law and human rights standards. However, this approach has predominantly been top-driven and the judicial sector has received minor funding compared with the security forces. It is debatable as to whether Afghans trust the formal justice system, but they may also not agree to the secular norms. Human rights issues are also contested, particularly with discrimination against women. For many, or even most, discriminating against women is not only acceptable, but desirable. Hence, Afghans may be taking cases to local courts precisely because, not despite, of human rights violations. In addition, case tracking mechanisms in the countryside are virtually non-existent. The following part will discuss these shortcomings.
Low Funding in the Afghan Judicial Sector
Italy was the lead donor overseeing Afghan judicial reform. Yet, Italy has failed to sufficiently invest in the judicial pillar. Only a meagre 2-4 per cent of the entire Security Sector Reform (SSR) budget was funded to the justice sector (World Bank 2005; Sedra 2006, 100; Tondini 2010, 61) . 90 per cent of public expenditure was supplied by international assistance and a staggering USD $36 billion a year is provided by the US military that primarily funds military and police reform (Waldman 2008, 1-3 of Taliban mobilization as recognized by international actors due to the lack of courthouses in the countryside. As a result, from 2008-10, the US poured funds into informal justice. The counter-insurgency reacted to public demand for justice where they were in power, allowing to get a foothold where they were not fully established. This was due to the failure of the first phases of SSR that failed to make an impact on the formal justice sector which remains weak, inaccessible and corrupt. This security problem led to support in the informal sector to deliver access to justice as part of stabilization attempts as 'Winning Hearts and Minds'.
Corruption leading to informal means of redress
Corruption and frustration with the Afghan justice system is widely noted. De Lauri (2013) identifies that the externally-driven centralized judicial system in Afghanistan has institutionalized corruption and alienated illiterate poor civilians 4 from inaccessible court systems. Most Afghans revert to traditional justice due to long-delays, high costs, difficulty of understanding laws and lack of capacity and inadequacy of the state legal system which is prone to corruption and unable to deliver impartial justice (Wardak 2005, 62) .
Many civil disputes (such as divorce, marriage, inheritance and domestic violence) and land issues are settled privately without involving state or provincial institutions. DFID's Justice
Adviser stated that the majority of civil and minor criminal cases 'are best dealt with at the local level using means of resources used for centuries which also maintains peace and security at the community level'. 5 The informal dispute sector promotes reconciliation, consensus and reintegration of criminal perpetrators into society in compliance with local customs. This process is facilitated by an elder, Mullah or even the Taliban to seek compromises and reconciliation from both parties, debatably fitting a model of restorative justice.
Wardak (2004) These manifestations as provided by the interviewees provide an understanding of corruption and the reasons as to why people consult community-based resolution processes, largely due to inaccessibility of courthouses. Another debatable reason is due to prevalent corruption within the judiciary. These factors can be found in many policy reports such as the Centre for Policy and Human Development (2007, (9) (10) (11) and Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) (2008) . The international approach to corruption consisted of reforming the justice sector in centralized zones. Subsequently, the approach attempted to replicate legal standards and the rule of law in the countryside (as part of legal pluralism). This has actually led to corruption and Taliban reactivity in southern areas of Afghanistan.
Human Rights Violations against Women
As part of the legal pluralist framework in Afghanistan, Shari'a Law has been included in the 2004 Afghan Constitution. In many provinces, including Helmand, the Taliban head community-based dispute resolutions. They procedurally breach human rights such as the right to a fair trial, the right to an appeal, and 'often dispense cruel, harsh and disproportionate corporal punishment' especially against women (Fearon 2010, 20) . In Pashtun tribal codes of community-based dispute resolution (Pashtunwali), ba'ad -the practice of the perpetrator's family giving girls away for marriage to the victim's family -is prevalent. The idea is that an aggrieved party will have their honour restored by their ability to attain compensation. A Legal
Researcher at the Max Planck Institute stressed that such practices, even though he was against it, are endorsed in order to settle a dispute such as murder or other insults to honour due to the instructions of a local council to promote reconciliation and avert a blood feud. 10 The knowledge of ba'ad and the legal issues surrounding it are in compliance of an international approach to advocating human rights which is part of judicial reform strategy and more broadly legal pluralism. Handing over girls for compensation is punishable with up to two years imprisonment under the Afghan Criminal Code. Ba'ad also breaches fundamental human rights but females in these circumstances are often reluctant to complain against the agreed actions of relatives.
Moreover, the Executive Director of the Afghanistan Independent Bar Association (AIBA) claimed that the right to a trained defence lawyer is often not known and women are excluded from Jirgas. 11 One could argue that the opinions of the interviewees are based on international approaches to human rights, gender rights and the strategy of legal pluralism by attempting to copy legal standards to community-based dispute resolution processes.
Low Judicial Capacity and Failure of Case Tracking
Judicial capacity is weak and this has resulted in shortcomings such as low numbers of judges to hear cases. A Human Rights Director of The Asia Foundation stated that 'in the formal justice sector there is not enough capacity, a lack of transparency and there is corruption which is the main problem which is definitely present in the Attorney General, Ministry of Justice and
Supreme Court altogether'. 12 At the national level, there are approximately 21,300 people to one judge; the ratio in Kandahar is 76,200 to one judge and 60,200 to one judge in Helmand (Röder and Zia 2010, 16) . The Supreme Court does not have the capacity 'to detect, investigate and prosecute cases of judicial misconduct, especially outside' Kabul (Chêne 2007, 3) . The Director of IWA argued that 'the biggest amount of corruption in the justice system happens at the district level then at the provincial and then at the national level with the Supreme Court and other bigger institutions but the core of it is really in the province and so it needs to be addressed.'
13
However, these arguments suggesting that the lack of capacity and/or resources with corruption is conflated. It is debatable whether corruption is either a direct cause or consequence of the capacity problem.
Outcomes of cases are difficult to trace in the countryside. Reviewing cases and building up case law is virtually impossible. Centralized services fail to reach the majority of rural Afghans.
There is no case tracking system at the provincial level which fails to monitor human rights at the Jirga level and state accountability remains limited. There is no official record-keeping system for decisions made in the informal systems which can lead to disputes re-emerging, particularly in land cases (Coburn and Dempsey 2010, 15) and corruption in the countryside.
Yet, this may happen in cases based on secular law also. The Special Advisor to the Executive Director of International Assistance Mission (IAM) argued that 'the drain of resources is the problem' and provinces 'do not have enough resources for the judicial system or the process will drag out and it is also difficult to have a transparent scheduling system that issues a case, taking its time until it gets treated'. 14 Lack of tracking systems lead to manipulation by judges who avoid using certain laws for their own interests. 15 The Team Leader of Afghanistan Rule of Law Project (ARoLP) stressed that at the rural level many decisions are not written down and are unreported with the parties agreeing to a resolution without a record. 16 These perceptions reveal that there is an emphasis on capacity concerns in the countryside. This delays proceedings which entices bribery and extortion. However, it should be acknowledged that courthouses in centralized parts of Afghanistan are arguably susceptible to corruption. Other factors include whether the plaintiff gets what they want during judicial processes -irrespective of localityand if the results are negative then the perception(s) will mirror it. Additional problems, namely concerning corruption, within the Afghan judicial system can be comprehended with a political economy lens.
Political Economy Approach
A political economy approach centres on the bureaucracy and behaviours of the state and actors.
This includes coping mechanisms for lowly paid civil servants and law enforcement actors.
Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that a political economy approach is useful in analysing coping strategies that lead to survival-based corruption to supplement low incomes.
Although a political economy approach is useful for the study of what constitutes corruption in a certain society, its actors and wider public provide a starting point for analysis. North et al. In patronage-based systems, elites may seek and utilize rents to benefit a group, tribe or ethnicity by distributing or redistributing resources and benefits which may hinder wider economic development. In such systems, informal rules govern politics while efforts from donors centralize and formalize legal requirements and enhance political competition in a contradictory process. By way of illustration, Bliesemann de Guevara and Kühn (2013) (2005), the majority of citizens surveyed indicated that they had personally paid bribes or used a contact to proceed with a general service request to an administrative body.
These aforementioned issues can be analysed in the context of the Afghan justice sector.
Chêne (2009) 23 This strengthens the notion that judicial corruption is due to poverty and that raising wages can reduce corruption. The Team Leader of ARoLP also stressed that pay reform is greatly needed in order to reduce bribery and extortion within the judiciary at all levels:
There is a pay reform that is now going through but it's going to take about two years to truly implement because they have to reclassify all the positions but somewhere in the mix over the next several years their salaries will be raised significantly and the judges salary will go to 500 or 600 dollars…With pay reform, at least you have hope.
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It was not disclosed where the money would come from in order to provide such a steep increase in judges' salaries in Afghanistan. It is important to note that judges' salaries in Afghanistan's neighbouring states are also low. For instance in Tajikistan, judicial staff are paid US-$30 and not higher than US-$100 per month (Ezrow and Frantz 2013, 145) . Moreover, it is vital to take into consideration that Afghan judges' salaries were raised ten times during the Taliban regime to curb corruption which only resulted in higher bribes (Demirbüken et al. 2009, 139) . Therefore, raising wages can also be counterproductive and low pay viewed not as the cause of corruption.
The majority of interviewees claimed that the Afghan justice sector is hindered by bribery and extortion. The Operations Officer of the ARTF argued that justice functions as a market commodity that can be purchased and 'in the provinces, you pay to get justice so the justice system here is corrupt'. 25 The Manager for Women's Rights of Action Aid similarly stated that a 'party may be rich and bribe the judge', which determines the outcome of the decision in their favour. 26 Azami (2009) also argues that adjudicators, the police and civil servants extort bribes from the public to speed-up processes. 62 per cent of Afghan households surveyed by IWA 27 stressed that they had experienced corruption within the courts as witnesses and complainants (IWA 2010, 11) .
Within the judiciary, corruption mainly occurs at district courts and the Attorney General's Office (AGO) in 39 per cent of cases according to IWA (2010, 11) . The Team Leader of ARoLP claimed that extortion prevails across the Afghan justice system with higher amounts being paid at higher levels. He specifically argued that the formal judicial sector is expensive due to extortion: a payment of US-$100 is made to a judge at the district level, US-$1,000 at the provincial level and US-$10,000 is paid at the Supreme Court. 28 The Director of IWA argued that the justice sector is perceived as the most corrupt after the police; the most corrupt areas in the justice sector 'include courts and attorneys' concerning land issues as a lot of money is involved in these cases. 29 The Special Advisor to the Executive Director of the IAM provided a thorough example of a judge who did not travel to Ghazni because there was no guarantee that he would receive a bribe. 30 The slow process of the justice system and expectation of bribes has impeded the credibility of the justice system. 31 The Attaché for Justice, Rule of Law and Human
Rights of the EU Delegation also argued that 'the formal justice system is extremely slow, very corrupt and hard to understand which just basically means that you have more entry points for corruption' due to delays and susceptibility of bribery.
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These perceptions reveal the great dissatisfaction with the justice sector due to delays, bribery and extortion. These shortcomings may be exacerbated by the notion that adjudicators receive low salaries to cover living costs and familial expenses. However, one should also consider that Afghanistan is recovering from over thirty years of war and several regime changes. Hence, one could argue that these perceptions provide exaggerated expectations of the justice sector and contentious causes of corruption such as low pay.
State Capture: Political and Criminal Infiltration of the Afghan Formal Judicial System
Parts of the Afghan state are infiltrated from criminal networks liaising with political elites to gain from the illicit drug economy. Law enforcement actors, namely police and judges, demand bribes to defer arrests and influence legal proceedings. The Afghan judiciary is also infiltrated from political elites, armed opposition groups and drug traffickers that influence decisions via bribery, harassment, threats and intimidation (Nojumi et al. 2009, 216 release them otherwise the prison will be issued a decree to release these notorious people'.
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The Advisor for the HOOAC similarly argued that 'if somebody with power is arrested, the next day he's released on bail and he's never prosecuted or pursued again' and it is the lack of implementing existent laws that is the problem due to connections, the lack of transparency and weak political will. 39 Therefore, 'the disposition of cases is commonly decided by bribes and those who pay bribes or have influential connections are released' (Chêne 2007, 3) . Protection from prosecution can be purchased if the amount is greater than the consequences for refusal.
For instance, Chief Judge of the Central Narcotics Tribunal Appeals Court, Mohammad Alim
Hanif, refused to take a bribe to rig the outcome of a prosecution and was consequently shot dead on 4 September 2008 by an unidentified gunman. A senior member of a cluster of working NGOs argued that judges need to be protected from such threats to combat judicial corruption. 40 These perceptions obtained from the interviews suggest that it is the underlying conditions of the state that has resulted to intrusion during criminal and corruption investigations. This clearly fits international explanations of state capture that deems such undesired behaviour as corrupt.
Concept of Corruption within the Afghan Social Context
As part of the political economy analysis, the nature of political and factional competition is enshrined in informal rules of authority to distribute state resources. In addition, informal rules are based on tribal, ethnic, social and familial ties so that elites can survive and factions can compete. Often, patronage is utilized to attain public resources -goods, political decisions and jobs -that are exchanged between patrons and clients. Administration posts may also be distributed to individuals in exchange for electoral support or other modes of loyalty. Political parties are able to unevenly channel state resources to favourable electoral constituencies which include territorial and ethnic groups or certain social classes.
Patronage in Afghanistan was tradition-based which organized both life and governance and was coded in Islamic terms, was hereditary, usually patrilineal and the patron-client relationship was closed to some groups that did not fit the hierarchical structure (Isby 2011) . However, Roy (1990, 215-216) argues that the war against the Soviets changed traditional patronage structures in which trail elites extracted resources from the population to one in which new elitesMujahidin commanders -were able to distribute resources (largely aid) to the population in return for support. Traditional patronage, however, is still evident regarding agricultural land.
The Afghan political culture of patronage and clientelism is based on those in powerful positions, such as governors and senior officials, distributing and redistributing state resources.
Powerful figures operate as a patron providing appointments and favours based on relationships and political loyalty to establish and preserve patronage networks instead of hiring on principles of meritocracy and equality which overrides proficiency and ethnic balance (Isby 2011 ).
The US and international allies have not dealt with the pre-existing patronage networks. The former Karzai government was installed and local warlords were paid by the Western intervention for fighting or services. These warlords enjoyed the opium and arms trade that remain as a major source of power and revenue, similar to foreign donor aid sourcing Karzai's power and income. The US supported the 2002 Loya Jirga which backed the political leadership of Karzai with strong hopes that Karzai would bring in the biggest international rents from the Western intervening countries (Kühn 2008, 315) . Karzai developed 'a personal patronage network' to survive in Afghan politics by gaining the support of warlords who controlled the countryside by appointing or 'buying them off with offers of cabinet posts and governorships' (Tomsen 2011, 643) .
Former President Karzai had no control over both Afghan security institutions. He provided powerbrokers such as Burhanuddin Rabbani and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayyaf the privilege to select cabinet ministers, presidential staff and police chief posts to protect their corruption and narcotics trafficking in exchange of supporting Karzai. The poppy economy can be perceived as a 'form of rent' due to the profit made by exporting refined opium (Kühn 2008, 318) . The accumulation of state resources have increased both 'inter-factional competition' and 'costs of appointments' and the sale of posts and protection is also existent in the Presidential Office (Goodhand 2008, 63-64 patronage and nepotism influence senior appointment decisions which affect the quality and access to judicial institutions and public services while the poor suffer the most by paying a higher slice of their incomes (Singh 2014) . Goetze and Guzina (2008, 316) reveal international assumptions of the failed state paradigm. This is when a state lacks a central authority to enforce law which provides opportunities for warlords and other militias to form networks of fortification and illegal trade. The majority of the interviewees, many quoted in this paper, 43 concurred with the international assumption of the failed state paradigm in relation to Afghan warlords engaging in poppy trafficking that subvert judicial and anti-corruption processes.
Problems with Appointments, Education and Training in the Afghan Formal Justice System
The Supreme Court is the highest constitutional court of appeal in Afghanistan and is mandated with the authority of the administration over a judiciary of 1,500 judges. Despite the authority of the Supreme Court, it lacks a transparent system which fails to discipline or dismiss judges for engaging in corruption and is deemed corrupt as an institution alongside the AGO (Jones 2008, 85) . The Supreme Court is often manipulated to provide political reviews of the actions Judicial appointments have been tainted with political manipulation and bias, particularly from armed opposition groups and warlords, and only 20 per cent of the Supreme Court consists of qualified judges (Stromseth et al. 2006, 233) . In the justice system lawyers rarely hold a law degree. 44 Only 12 per cent of judges hold a law degree, 44 per cent holds an Islamic law degree and only 21 per cent have high school education (Windle and Farrell 2010, 6) . In the AGO's 45 Kabul Office, only 37 per cent of 282 prosecutors held a university degree in 2007 (Tondini 2010, 70) . In Uruzgan, none of the seven working judges held a degree (Röder and Zia 2010, 13-14) . Rafi (2014) argued that the lack of qualified adjudicators is due to many judges that graduated from an old system or Sharia Law School. These judges arguably lack an understanding of the Afghan Constitution and criminal codes. During an interview, the Team Leader of ARoLP stated that 'in some districts, not all judges have graduated from law schools'
and 'when you're dealing with judges that haven't even been to law school, there is not a lot of hope '. 46 This has led to contradicting interpretation of laws and whether decisions are taken in accordance with the Afghan constitution. Moreover, the Executive Director of AIBA stressed that the majority of 'judges and prosecutors don't know about the defence lawyer's responsibility and because of that the defence lawyer is faced with some challenges and problems during cases'. 47 The understanding of the situation, based on this perception, is based on legal standards and the competency of adjudicators to fulfil such standards. Chief of Police and budding governors may engage in a bidding war. 48 This notion fits international assumptions of the failed state on arbitrary institutions that circumvent meritocracy.
Sociological Approaches: Functionalism and Social Construction
Corruption may be viewed as part of a predatory neo-patrimonial system for elites to survive by expanding loyalty to political supporters and fellow tribes. Functionalists such as Alatas (1990, 184 ) deem corruption as a necessary consequence of development. Merton (1968) argues that the covert aspects of political machinery allows political favours to be bought and sold which has economic and political benefits and bribery greases the wheels by enhancing efficiency and undermining red tape. Huntington (1968, 386) argues that a bureaucracy with rigid rules can hinder economic growth and it is corruption that helps to integrate people within the political state system. If advocating this functionalist perspective, one could argue that corruption is a necessity for overall economic and political integration.
These arguments underline that corruption improves efficiency. This is based on the notion that widespread and rigid public regulations cost too much economically. These costs can be reduced or even avoided via bribery. The arguments already presented from the interview excerpts, civil society perceptions reports (namely IWA and UNDP) and the literature suggests that bribery and extortion in Afghanistan are part of everyday interactions that may grease the wheels but these processes actually hinder the trust and usage of court systems. Corruption is considered as an evil from Afghan society but the payment of bribes is deemed as an inevitable form of interaction with public officials, including judges, who are good officials if they accept payoffs to carry out their duties without delays (Barfield 2012, x) . This is referred to as reshwa in Arabic, and means a bribe translated as water obtained from a well with a bucket. Moreover, such transactions may include a gift, favour or tip which is referred to as bakhshish in Afghan courthouses but can also be deemed as reshwa. This is part of a social contract between adjudicators (or public officials) with citizens that utilize such services.
When considering a social construction analysis of corruption, there are many conceptions and manifestations as to what constitutes corruption across the globe. Western conceptions are largely associated with a legalistic view that also includes gift-giving and patronage. In addition,
there are similarities and differences in many cultures and contexts, particularly those that have blurred public and private spheres. Gupta's (1995, 379) narration of an Indian land official, Sharmaji, who held an estimated 5,000 plots of land registry at his home but always stated to villagers that it cost money to register or change land titles, illustrates such blurring of public and private spheres. This resulted in villagers not complaining about having to pay bribes or that the office was in the same house with the homeowner performing his duties, as would be argued in a Western setting; instead villagers complained with the performance to attain interaction and deals with state officials. Blurred private and public spheres may be deemed as corruption in the West, while other societies may view it as acceptable behaviour. Thus, corruption is a social construction and specific to cultures and not just states and legal systems (Gupta 1995, 392) . Azfar et al. (2001, 44) argue that in some cultures, a gift or tip is provided to a public official for providing a service but it might be debatable as to when a gift or tip constitutes as a bribe.
For instance, in China there are social connections and relationships referred to as gaunxi practices where giving gifts forms obligatory mutual cooperation between two familiar parties.
Repaying gifts is done on the basis of what feels right and to avoid losing the interest and familiarity because refusal to accept or reciprocate to a gift customarily leads to 'loss of face' (Yang 1989, 42) . Similarly in Russia, 'personal networks and informal contacts' to attain services and goods that are scarce and to find ways 'around formal procedures' is called blat.
This concerns favours that are based on mutual efficacy -personal ties of kinship or friendshipforming moral obligations to help others in which bosses apportion favours to protect their selfimage (Ledeneva 1998, 1) . Blat like guanxi focuses on forming and preserving personal and peaceful relationships between the parties involved, forging good, ideally clientelistic and patronage contacts. It can be argued that customary practices in some societies involve giftgiving which is a cultural norm and not deemed as corruption in some states.
Corruption may be deemed as an endemic or cancer in certain societies and be more focused on moral and ethical impositions. A study conducted by Walton (2012) (Walton 2012, 3-7) . If corruption is prevalent and deemed as a great evil and/or cancer then it could be argued that moral and social principles can function as a remedy. Approaches that look at morality and ethics are relevant to the society and/or cultures. This can include focusing on religion, ethics and morality with the use of empowering religious leaders, particularly in non-secularized societies.
The Need to focus on Islam, Ethics and Morality
Islamic principles, law and customs differ from Western-based imposed ideals such as the rule of law. However, the latter has been the primary focus in relation to Afghan centralization of state justice. This shaped the arguments to counter corruption as illicit gain which entered the ANDS (2008) and led to the ratification of the United Nations Convention against Corruption and creation of the HOOAC. If a theological lens is applied, then it can be contended that a rich man may be able to pay for justice but he will be unable to pay in the eyes of God because one cannot purchase a lawyer for such defence. This thinking may be relevant for societies that value religion extensively and rely on religious interpretations of wrongful behaviour, including corruption. However, Pavarala and Malik (2010) The international community has attempted to circulate basic rule of law and human rights standards in informal settings and teachings in schools and seminars conducted by Mullahs (Tondini 2007, 342 52 These perceptions reveal that the social contract between citizens and justice providers has weakened. This has undermined faith of the justice system and resulted in the belief that local power-holders are more trustworthy and less susceptible to corruption than state modes of justice. These figures are in a position to be empowered in order to promote human rights and anti-corruption.
Conclusion
This paper considers several approaches when analysing corruption. A political economy approach to corruption is integral for understanding the role of the institutions, structures and behaviours and political and criminal processes. The main features of Afghanistan's political economy are complex that is concerned not just with informal networks, but institutional ones.
The rules of the game concern both rules of a formal and informal nature, cultural norms and neo-patrimonial ties whether ethnic, tribal, familial or social, which governs actors' behaviours.
Predation, rent-seeking and patronage are behaviours endorsed by elites to preserve loyalty, power and manipulation of the distribution of state resources and appointments without compliance of meritocracy. In addition, the main behaviours of lowly paid judges and prosecutors consist of extorting bribes as an economic coping strategy. These practices resemble the close connection between political and economic power and rent seeking as theorized by North et al. (2013) Justice is perceived as a market commodity which would fit a functionalist model of analysis in order to grease the wheels of a bureaucratic machinery. This has, however, weakened the social contract between people and the justice sector and thus undermined faith and legitimacy of the justice system. There is also a social contract between people and other non-state actors such as elders or other trusted parties who chief community-based dispute resolution processes.
Hence, citizens are reluctant to utilize the legal system and judicial services due to prevalent corruption, namely bribery, with higher rates paid at higher courts. According to the majority of the interviewees, there is a dichotomy of the formal and informal modes of justice in
Afghanistan and the informal modes are consulted despite renowned human rights abuses due to prevalent corruption in the formal sector.
An increase in wages for judicial staff has been proposed by many of the interviewees as a strategy to reduce corruption but this may also increase the demand for higher paid bribes. It can also be contended that the manifestations and perceptions of corruption differ from one society to the next. Gift-giving and other informal practices are part of a social contract to maintain relations that may be deemed as corruption in the West but not in Asian and African societies. In addition, other cultures may deem immoral acts such as selling sex or a fasad as higher forms of corruption over bribery and embezzlement, as addressed by Walton's (2012) 
study in Papa New
Guinea and De Lauri's (2013) study on the Afghan justice sector. These may differ from Western definitions. The essence of such an analysis and approach teaches us that corruption is socially constructed dependent on the perceptions rather than textbook definitions.
Given the empirical nature of this paper, the perceptions of corruption in Afghanistan -based on the interviews conducted in mainly Kabul -can be associated with the common narratives that can be accessed in policy papers and agency reports. The low pay explanation of enticing petty forms of corruption, the lack of case tracking systems and adjudicators' poor understanding of human rights and legal standards -and many other factors as addressed in this paper -were frequently emphasized by the interviewees. These manifestations of the causes and consequences of judicial corruption and alleged ignorance of human rights standards, namely in the countryside, are unitedly shared by those interviewed in Kabul.
In addition, traits of the international failed state paradigm were stressed by many of the interviewees. They stressed that patronage, nepotism and opportunities for warlords and criminal networks to profit from opium trafficking persisted. It was expressed that these features undermined the rule of law, judicial processes and corruption investigations. It may be questioned whether these limited variations in explaining corruption, and other problems addressed, imply that the very narrative that the majority of Afghan adjudicators and parliamentarians are corrupt shapes international perceptions of all undesired behaviour as corrupt. It can also be contended that the justice sector is particularly prone to accusations of corruption in many parts of the world, especially by those who do not get the desired results.
Hence, the manifestations of the shortcomings of the Afghan justice sector as expressed by the interviewees are based on internationally framed understandings of corruption, legal standards, human rights, capacity frailties and the failed state syndrome that arguably led to Taliban remobilization. Despite such contentions, this paper has analytically distinguished where the problems arise from corruption that includes legal pluralism and the lack of funding but also of exaggerated expectations towards the state and the justice sector.
In terms of dialogue and training, Islam, morality and ethics that are relevant to the Afghan context can form stronger debates and enhance efforts for Afghans to discuss corruption and develop measures to curb it. Instead of forming a dichotomy between formal and informal justice in Afghanistan and the pitfalls of both -notably bribery and human rights abuses respectivelylegal pluralism can only merge all forms of jurisprudence by including influential figures such as
Mullahs to place higher emphasis on the rule of law, various legal codes and human rights.
Therefore, the sociological and political economy approaches to corruption and emphasis on morality, ethics and religion help identifying problems in the Afghan judicial sector and methods to curb corruption. Such an approach is pivotal to conjure a viable anti-corruption strategy -and legal pluralist approach if pursued -as the new President, Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, has a huge task to restore public faith in the highly corrupt, inaccessible and incompetent justice sector.
With recent decreased international involvement, the justice sector needs to have a high priority in order to avoid further Taliban resurgence.
53 Such practices are rife in Afghanistan and engrained within main institutions such as the MoI as one example that also functions as a shop selling posts to the highest bidders. 54 This is a consequence of state capture. The Advisor of the HOOAC claimed that in his experience political interference influences judicial and anti-corruption cases and many are dropped due to cronyism (see n.34).
